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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
HiK Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of I" Itah 
Code mr >; ;.x . .' M **. . ) 
STATKMENTOF ISSUES PRESENTED 
J>id the Court; below en: when it granted BYIT\ Motion to Dismiss for I ack of 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction':' 
liriii Il fir ('infill bdow HI WIIHI il denied the Mallory's request for discovery under 
Rule 56(f)? • • • ' ' 
Did the Court below err when it glided B V ( J ' s Motion for a Change ol v'enui11 
5 I A M ; A K J J 0 F R E \ IEW 
A district court's granting of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction is reviewed for correctness; viewing the facts in the light most fkv oi able to 
the nonmoving party. [A]ppellate rev ie\ >.- of a ti ial coi irt s detei mina tion of th 3 la w is 
in .. -re • - *. the 1 e 1 1 11 'correctness.'" State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 
1994
 s -<u .-or. v.itc v. Jackson, 2010 I IT \pp 136,1" 9, P.3d ; Call v. Keiter, 2010 UT 
App -^ * - - 128. 
: \„ disti ict coi 11 t" s gi anting of amotion for change venue is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of Tooele City, 2010 I T ^ r 53. 233 
P.3d 461; United States Bank Nat' 1 As> :. \ 1 * 
433. 
4_ 
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A district court's denial of a 56(f) affidavit is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); accord State v. Jackson, 2010 UT App 136, 19, -
P.3d-; Call v. Keiter, 2010 UT App 55,1j 14, 230 P.3d 128. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from two separate decisions in the underlying case. 
After sustaining significant injuries in a motorcycle accident which occurred as 
Mallory was leaving a BYU parking lot under the direction of BYU student/employee 
Sarah Robinson, Mallory sued BYU, Robinson, and the driver of the vehicle which struck 
Mr. Mallory, Vern Stratton. (R. 21). 
The first Court below (Third District Court) granted BYU's motion for a change 
of venue to the Fourth District Court. (R. 78). The Fourth District Court then granted 
BYU's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied the Plaintiffs 
request under Rule 56(f) for discovery. (R. 194) 
Summary of the Claims 
1. The Plaintiff, Randal Roy Mallory ("Mallory"), is an individual residing in Utah 
County, State of Utah. (R. 21) 
2. Defendant, Brigham Young University ("BYU"), is a Utah Corporation, doing 
business in, and with offices located in, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R. 21) 
3. Sarah Robinson was a BYU traffic cadet and was the agent and employee of BYU 
and was acting within the purpose and scope of this agency and employment. (R. 21) 
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4. Mallory was the owner of a Harley Davidson motorcycle, Utah License no. 386 
XH. (R. 22) 
5. University Avenue runs past the BYU parking located south of 1850 North in 
Provo, Utah ("BYU Parking Lot"). University Avenue runs north and south past the 
west entrance/exit to the BYU Parking Lot. Said entrance/exit is approximately fifty 
(50) feet south of 1850 North. (R. 22) 
6. On April 12, 2008, at 2:45 p.m., Mallory was operating the Harley Davidson 
motorcycle and was at a stop in the north exit lane of the west entrance/exit of the 
BYU Parking Lot facing west. (R. 22) 
7. Plaintiff was stopped awaiting the directions of the BYU traffic cadet, Sarah 
Robinson to proceed south on University Avenue. (R. 22) 
8. After Robinson negligently stopped the north and south bound traffic on 
University Avenue, she negligently directed Plaintiff to make his left hand turn and 
continue south on University Avenue. (R. 22) 
9. At that time and place Stratton was proceeding south bound on University 
Avenue approaching the entrance/exit of the BYU Parking Lot. Stratton either 
disobeyed the directions of Robinson to stop as all three other lanes had stopped, or 
negligently proceeded past traffic that had been stopped in the inside lane and 
negligently, carelessly, recklessly, and unlawfully struck the Plaintiff who was 
following the specific instructions of Robinson. (R. 23) 
10. The negligent actions of Robinson and Stratton proximately caused Stratton's 
vehicle to collide with Mallory's motorcycle and to proximately cause the injuries and 
damages suffered by Mallory. (R. 23) 
11. As a proximate result of the negligence, carelessness, and unlawfulness of 
defendants, and each of them, and the resulting collision, as herein alleged, Mallory 
was injured in his health, strength, and activity, sustaining injury to his body and 
shock and injury to his nervous system and person, and among others, sustained the 
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following personal injuries: severe skull fracture and intracranial hemorrhage, all of 
which injuries have caused and continue to cause plaintiff great mental, physical, and 
nervous pain and suffering. These injuries have resulted in a permanent disability to 
Mallory, and he is and will continue to be unable to be gainfully employed. (R. 23) 
12. As a further proximate result of the negligence of defendants, Mallory was 
required to employ physicians and surgeons for medical examination, treatment, and 
care of his injuries. Mallory incurred substantial medical expenses and he will incur 
further medical expenses for the care and treatment of these injuries. (R. 23) 
13. Mallory had been gainfully employed as a salesman for dental laboratories, and 
was earning an average monthly income in excess of $10,000.00. As a result of the 
accident he has been prevented from being so employed. (R. 23) 
14. As a result of the accident Mallory (as of the filing of the amended complaint) had 
seen five (5) treating physicians that would be witnesses in the case. (R. 50) Of those 
five (5) physicians, three (3) are in Utah County and two (2) are in Salt Lake County. 
(R. 50). 
15. Since the accident, Mallory's sister and his mother were handling his day to day 
financial affairs. In fact his social security disability.checks are written jointly to 
Mallory and his mother. (R. 50). They would also be witnesses in the case and they 
live in Salt Lake County. (R. 50) 
16. After the filing of the Complaint, BYU moved to have the venue transferred to the 
Fourth District Court in Provo. The motion was granted. (R. 78) 
17. After the case was moved to Provo, Judge Laycock granted BYU's motion to 
dismiss on the basis that BYU was immune from suit under the Governmental 
Immunity Act. (R. 194). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although BYU styled their motion as one to dismiss, the inclusion of facts outside 
the four corners of the complaint either requires a denial of their motion or the motion 
should have been treated as one for summary judgment. 
There is one Utah case on point: Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, 
Inc., 70 P.3d 904, 473 Utah Adv. Rep. 50,2003 UT 23. 
As is shown below, as a Motion to Dismiss, the motion should have been denied; 
it should have been treated as a motion for summary judgment, Mallory should have been 
given the opportunity to conduct discovery into the the relevant areas; the motion should 
have been denied because, at most, Ms. Robinson was an independent contractor. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED BECAUSE THE 
FACTS AS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATED 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. 
In determining whether it is proper for a trial court to grant a party's motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the factual allegations in the complaint 
must be taken as true and the court must consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn 
there from in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. In re Uintah Basin, 133 P.3d 410, 
548 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 2006 UT 19, rehearing denied. A motion to dismiss is properly 
granted only in cases in which, even if the factual assertions in the complaint were 
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correct, they provided no legal basis for recovery. Mackev v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081, 
389 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2000 UT App 36, rehearing denied; Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6). 
Because dismissal of a complainant's action is a severe measure, it should be 
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any 
state of facts which could be proved in support of its claim. Id. 
Further, raising an affirmative defense, like a qualified privilege, for the first time 
in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not generally appropriate since 
dismissal under governing rule is justified only when the allegations of the complaint 
itself clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim. Zoumadakis v. Uintah 
Basin Medical Center, Inc., 122 P.3d 891, 530 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 2005 UT App 325. 
Here, the BYU Defendants' arguments all rely upon facts not found in the 
complaint. On its face, the amended complaint states that Ms. Robinson acted 
negligently in directing the traffic which caused Mr. Mallory's injuries. There are no 
facts in the first amended complaint that allege any relationship with Provo City. Thus, 
taking the complaint on its face the motion to dismiss should have been denied. 
II. MALLORY WAS ENTITLED TO A CONTINUANCE OF THE MOTION 
PENDING FURTHER DISCOVERY. 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f), if it appears from an affidavit opposing a motion for 
summary judgment that the party cannot by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance 
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to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or 
may make such other order as is just. 
Here, the BYU Defendants relied upon facts not set forth in the pleadings. They 
submitted the affidavit of Arnold Lemmon which purported to set forth facts which the 
Court could rely upon to grant BYU's motion. 
Because the case was still in the preliminary stages of discovery, Mallory had not yet 
developed the factual record relating to the relationship between Ms. Robinson and Provo City. 
A Rule 56(f) affidavit accompanied Mallory's memorandum requesting time to conduct 
discovery into that relationship through the depositions of BYU, Mr. Lemmon, and Provo City. 
Although Mallory could find no case stating that a motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction could be converted to a motion for summary judgment or any case explicitly 
allowing a 56(f) affidavit in that situation, the granting of the motion without allowing Mallory 
to conduct discovery was clearly in error. 
BYU simply named a motion for summary judgment a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Certainly the rules should be interpreted to preserve Mallory's right 
to due process. Allowing BYU to submit any evidence outside the complaint, without allowing 
Mallory the time to gather controverting evidence was unfair, prejudicial, and a denial of 
Mallory's due process. 
Ill, EVEN TREATED AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WITHOUT 
GRANTING A CONTINUANCE TO DEVELOP THE FACTUAL RECORD, ON ITS 
FACE THE MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED. 
-6-
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For a moving party to be entitled to summary judgment, it must establish a right to 
judgment based on the applicable law as applied to the undisputed facts. See, Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c); Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24,25 (Utah 
1990). Summary judgment "should be granted only when all the facts entitling the moving party 
to a judgment are clearly established or admitted." Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah 
1978). For summary judgment to be appropriate, these undisputed facts provided by the moving 
party must "preclude [ ], as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to the losing party." FMA 
Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1979); see also Staker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1990) ("[TJhere must exist undisputed facts in the evidence 
before the trial court relating to each of the elements of [the legal doctrine upon which the trial 
court rests its decision to grant summary judgment] in order for us to affirm the ruling.") 
The BYU Defendants argument required that they show all of the following: 
1. traffic direction on public roads is a governmental function. 
2. authorization to perform a governmental function makes the actor an agent of the government 
granting the authorization; and 
3. All agents are automatically employees of the authorizing government under the UGIA. 
The BYU Defendants' arguments failed under the second and third requirements to their 
argument. 
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING IN SMITH v. FOUR CORNERS PROHIBITS A 
FINDING THAT SARAH ROBINSON WAS AN EMPLOYEE UNDER THE UGIA 
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc. concerned the liability of a health care 
provider and foster parents for injuries one foster child inflicted on another foster child. The 
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Plaintiff sued Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc. and his foster parents, Larry and Carolyn 
Randall, claiming damages for injuries he received when he was purportedly sexually assaulted 
by another foster child placed with the Randalls. Smith alleged that Four Corners1 negligence 
stemmed from its failure to supervise the Randalls and properly provide foster care services, and 
the Randalls' negligence stemmed from their failure to properly supervise Smith's activities with 
another foster child. Four Corners and the Randalls filed separate motions for summary 
judgment. The district court granted both motions and the Supreme Court reversed as to the 
Randalls and remanded the case. 
The Randalls' argued in their motion for summary judgment that they were immune from 
suit under the doctrine of governmental immunity. 
The district court had determined that the Randalls were entitled to the same immunity as 
DHS. The Supreme Court ruled that the Randalls would be entitled to summary judgment only if 
they established a relationship sufficient to entitle them, as a matter of law, to the same immunity 
enjoyed by DHS. 
The Randalls argued that they were qualified to receive the same treatment as DHS 
because they were employees of DHS for purposes of the UGIA and that the UGIA grants 
immunity to such employees. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-2(2)(a)(1997 & Supp.2002). According 
to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4, a governmental employee may not "be held personally liable for 
acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority." Id. § 63-30-4(4). "Employee" is defined by statute as 
governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a 
governing body,... educational aides, students engaged in providing services to members of the 
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public in the course of an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical 
training program, volunteers, and tutors. Employee specifically does not include an independent 
contractor. Id.§ 63-30-2(2)(a) (Supp.2002) (emphasis added). 
The facts presented by the Randalls to establish that they were employees were as 
follows: they were licensed, approved, and controlled by DHS as foster parents; DHS placed 
Smith in their home. 
Despite the fact that DHS licensed, approved and controlled the Randalls, the Supreme 
Court found that there was not sufficient evidence to show that they were employees of DHS and 
not independent contractors. 
The Supreme Court stated that DHS employees would be entitled to immunity but that 
DHS independent contractors would not be entitled to immunity. The Court further stated that 
"in general, an independent: contractor is one who is engaged to do some particular project or 
piece of work, usually for a set total sum, who may do the job in his [or her] own way, subject to 
only minimal restriction or controls and is responsible only for its satisfactory completion." 
(citing Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 1999 UT 77,111, 985 P.2d 243 (citing Harry L. 
Young & Sons v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1975)). 
In this case the relationship between Sarah Robinson and Provo City was substantially 
less than that of the Randalls to DHS. In the Smith case, the governmental agency, DHS, 
selected and hired the Randalls. Here, BYU selected and hired Ms. Robinson. In the Smith case, 
DHS licensed and controlled the Randalls. Here, there was absolutely no evidence whatsoever 
that Provo City approved, licensed or exercised any control over Ms. Robinson. In fact, the only 
-9-
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relationship between Ms. Robinson and Provo City is the Provo City code section which 
authorized Ms. Robinson and persons like her to direct traffic. 
Provo did not pay Ms. Robinson. Provo did not give her any instructions. Provo did not 
tell her where or when to direct traffic. Provo did not control Ms. Robinson. Under those facts, 
Ms. Robinson is not even an independent contractor, let alone an employee. 
Clearly, under the reasoning of Smith, the BYU Defendants have not established that Ms. 
Robinson was an employee under the UGIA. 
Despite the fact that it is the only case on point, BYU ignored the case in its opening 
memorandum. Despite the fact that Mallory centered his opposition on the case, BYU did not 
even mention the case in its reply. 
B. THE ACTIONS OF MS. ROBINSON, EVEN IF AUTHORIZED, DID NOT CLOTHE 
HER OR BYU WITH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
The BYU Defendants' argue that because a Provo City ordinance authorized Ms. 
Robinson to direct traffic on a public street that she was therefore an employee of the authorizing 
entity under the UGIA. 
While Mallory could not find any case discussing the relationship between statutory 
authority to perform what is usually a governmental action and governmental immunity, by 
analogy, Mallory showed the flaw in the argument of the BYU Defendants. 
The analogy is to the governmental function of arrest. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-7-3, is the Utah code section authorizing any member of the public 
to effect a citizen's arrest. It reads as follows: 
A private person may arrest another: 
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence; or 
-10-
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(2) When a felony has been committed and he has reasonable cause to 
believe the person arrested has committed it. 
Clearly the act of arresting is one that is a governmental function. Nonetheless, the State 
Legislature has enacted section 77-7-3, to explicitly state that private persons, and not 
government employees, may make an arrest in certain circumstances. Were this Court to adopt 
the reasoning of the BYU Defendants, then every time that a citizen made a citizen's arrest under 
the conditions set forth under the code, the citizen would have the same governmental immunity 
sought by BYU in this case. 
By linking authority with immunity, the BYU Defendants' argument and reasoning 
would result in an untenable expansion of the scope of governmental immunity. 
C. THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE BYU DEFENDANTS 
COMPLIED WITH SECTION 9.10,060 OF THE PROVO CITY CODE. 
Provo City Code §9.10.060 authorizes Provo city employees and college and university 
employees who are not peace officers to direct traffic on public streets. It reads as follows: 
9.10.060. Traffic Control by Non-Peace Officers. 
(1) Subject to the limitations described in Subsection (3) of this 
Section a person who is employed by Provo City and is not a peace 
(2) Subject to the limitations described in Subsection (3) of this 
Section a person who is employed by a college or university and is 
not a peace officer may direct traffic on public streets while under 
the supervision of a peace officer employed by the same college or 
university. 
(3) A non-peace officer may direct traffic as described in 
Subsections (1) and (2) of this Section only in cases of public 
emergency or to aid in the orderly movement of traffic related to 
public gatherings in excess of 5,000 people. 
(4) It shall be unlawful for the driver of a motor vehicle to fail or 
refuse to obey the directions of a non -peace officer directing traffic as 
permitted in this Section. (Enacted 1990-20) 
-11-
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In support of their motion the BYU Defendants made the legal conclusion that Arnold 
Lemmon was supervising Sarah Robinson. The affidavit does not state that he was in the 
presence of Ms. Robinson at the time of the accident. The affidavit does not state that he was 
giving directions or observing the actions of Ms. Robinson at the time of the accident. 
Had Mr. Lemmon been "supervising" Ms. Robinson, it should be presumed that he would 
have seen the accident and would have provided a statement on the police report. He did not, in 
fact, provide any statement and, presumably, when he says he was "supervising" he was doing so 
in the broadest possible definition of the word "supervising." 
D. THE BYU DEFENDANTS PROVIDED NO NOTICE THAT THEY WERE 
GOVERNMENTAL AGENTS. 
Both the United States Constitution and the state constitution require due process. For a 
BYU employee and BYU to claim that they are entitled to governmental immunity, the potential 
plaintiffs in suits like this must have some notice that in certain circumstances a private (church 
owned) entity is an agent of the government. Further, the statutes cited by the BYU Defendants 
authorizing traffic direction from the state to municipalities and the ordinance of Provo City do 
not put a potential plaintiff on notice that the statute and ordinance are creating governmental 
employees. Additionally, since multiple statutes, rules and ordinances create or allow the actions 
above, which governmental entity is supposed to get the UGIA notice? 
Due process and open courts require that the potential plaintiff be provided a fair 
opportunity to be heard. Absent notice, he has no opportunity. 
E. IF THE ORDINANCE CONFLICTS WITH STATE LAW, IT IS THE ORDINANCE 
WHICH MUST BE STRUCK DOWN. 
-12-
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The BYU Defendants make the conclusion that because a Provo City ordinance 
authorizes college employees to direct traffic and because the Utah Supreme Court has stated 
that regulation of vehicular traffic on public streets is non-delegable, then Ms. Robinson had to 
be a state employee. This argument completely ignores the possibility that the ordinance is in 
violation of state law. This Court can certainly find that the ordinance, if it violates state case 
law or statute, is not legal. 
Further, an ordinance that clothes a religious institution with governmental immunity 
would appear to violate the separation of church and state. Were there numerous colleges and 
universities in Provo, the argument would not be persuasive. But where there is a school the size 
of BYU that is owned by the church which is attended and supported by a large majority of the 
residents of the enacting body (Provo), the ordinance appears to unconstitutionally violate the 
separation of church and state. 
IV. THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED BYU'S MOTION 
FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE ON THE SOLE BASES OF DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE 
AND SITE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
On October 19, 2009, Judge Robert Faust granted BYU's motion to transfer venue 
because: "all Defendant's (sic) reside in Utah County and the place of the accident was Utah 
County. 
The general transfer of venue statute., Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-9, provides: 
The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the following cases: 
(1) when the county designated in the complaint is not the proper county. 
(2) when there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had in the county, city, 
or precinct designated in the complaint. 
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the 
change. 
(4) when all the parties to an action, by stipulation or by consent in open court entered in 
the minutes, agree that the place of trial may be changed to another county. Thereupon 
the court must order the change as agreed upon. 
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The venue statute, Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-307 provides as follows: 
(1) In all other cases an action shall be tried in the county in which: 
(a) the cause of action arises; or 
(b) any defendant resides at the commencement of the action. 
(2) If the defendant is a corporation, any county in which the corporation has its principal 
office or a place of business shall be considered the county in which the corporation resides. 
(3) If none of the defendants resides in this state, the action may be commenced and tried in 
any county designated by the plaintiff in the complaint. 
(4) If the defendant is about to depart from the state, the action may be tried in any county 
where any of the parties resides or service is had. 
BYU argued for an order changing venue for two reasons. First they argued that Salt 
Lake County is not a proper county. Second, they argued that "convenience of witnesses in the 
ends of justice" make Utah County an appropriate location for the case. 
All laws that have to do with the removal of action from one local jurisdiction to another 
for trial have one definite purpose, that is to promote justice by avoiding local matters of a 
prejudicial nature that might be detrimental to the rights of one of the parties. The authority of a 
court to order a change of place of trial existed at common law as part of its inherent power to 
assure a fair and impartial trial in dispensing justice. Anderson v. Johnson, 1 Utah 2d 400, 268 
P.2d 427 (Utah 195A){citations omitted). 
General policy of law is that where plaintiff has commenced lawsuit and acquired 
jurisdiction over defendant, he should be allowed to pursue his remedy, and that motion to 
dismiss on grounds of improper forum should be granted only with great caution and under 
compelling circumstances, as in cases where it appears either that plaintiff has selected 
inconvenient forum for purpose of harassing or annoying defendant or where applicable factors 
preponderate so strongly against trying case where it is filed, and in favor of greater convenience 
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of trying it somewhere else, that denying motion would work hardship upon defendant. Summa 
Corp. v. Lancer Industries, Inc., 559 P.2d 544 (Utah 1977). 
A. SALT LAKE COUNTY IS A PROPER COUNTY . 
The Amended Complaint, at paragraph 2, states that BYU is a Utah Corporation, doing 
business in, and with offices located in, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
In its brief BYU incorrectly states that venue is proper "in any county in which the 
corporation has its principle office or place of business." The missing "a" between "or" and 
"place of business" makes the statute read that a principal place of business is required. It clearly 
is not. Venue is proper in the county of its principle office or in a county where it has a place of 
business. 
The Complaint properly alleged that BYU does business in and has offices in (i.e. a place 
of business) Salt Lake County. BYU did not dispute that fact 
Thus the venue chosen by the Plaintiff was a proper venue. 
B. CONVENIENCE OF WITNESSES AND THE ENDS OF JUSTICE MADE SALT 
LAKE COUNTY A PROPER VENUE. 
Contrary to the assertions of BYU, convenience of witnesses did not mandate a change of 
venue. As set forth in the affidavit of Mr. Mallory, 40% of his physicians are in Salt Lake 
County, and his two family members who would be witnesses are in Salt Lake County. While 
the accident took place in Utah County, that does not mean the venue is proper in the face of the 
Plaintiffs election to bring suit in another county where venue is proper. 
-15-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Moreover, BYU is one of the largest employers in Utah County and enjoys substantial 
support from the residents of Utah County. For that, and other reasons, Mallory was rightfully 
concerned about receiving an unbiased forum in Utah County. 
In fact, he found out at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that the judge sitting on his 
case was a graduate of BYU and BYU's law school and her husband was employed at BYU. 
Neither of the reasons for granting the motion were based upon any statute or case law. 
In fact neither reason appears or could be construed to appear in the governing law. 
Mr. Mallory was entitled to pursue his claims in Salt Lake County. Four of his seven 
witnesses reside in Salt Lake County and he was rightfully concerned about bias in Utah County. 
It is not a case about real property. It was a case about a motorcycle accident. Mr. Mallory as 
plaintiff was entitled to choose the forum. 
CONCLUSION 
As a motion to dismiss, the motion must be denied. If it is treated as a motion for 
summary judgment it would only appropriate to grant it where "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). Here, Mallory requested the time necessary to take the depositions of Mr. 
Lemmon, Ms. Robinson and Provo City. However, even though he was denied such discovery, 
the motion on its face did not show that the BYU Defendants were entitled to dismissal. 
The change of venue was improper and unfair to Mr. Mallory. It too should be 
overturned. 
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Respectfully, the Appellant requests that both the Motion to Dismiss Order and the Order 
granting the change of venue and the Judgment be vacated and reversed and the case remanded 
for trial in the Third District Court. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM 
Attached as an addendum are: 
1. Supplemental Affidavit of Arnold Lemmon. 
2. First Amended Complaint. 
Dated this / J day of July, 2011 
/~\ 
± y 
^-Curtis L. \^nger, 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Salt Lake County, Utah. I am over 
the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 30 
East Broadway, Suite 204 Salt Lake City, UT 84111. OnMaf^J 2011,1 placed for delivery 
via U.S. Mail two true and correct copies of the within document, APPELLANT'S BRIEF in a 
sealed envelope, to the following: 
STEVEN M. SANDBERG 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
Office of General Counsel 
ASB A-357 
Provo,UT 84602-1333 
Attorneys for BYU 
JOSEPH J. JOYCE 
J. JOYCE AND ASSOCIATES 
* 10813 South River Front Pkwy, 
Suite 460 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Attorney for Vern Stratton 
And, one original and eight copies of APPELLANT'S BRIEF were served 
to the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals 
Executed on July H>201 \
 a t S a j t L ake city, Utah. 
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Steven M. Sandberg (12421) 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
Office of the General Counsel 
ASB A-357 
Provo, UT 84602-1333 
Telephone: (801) 422-3089 
Facsimile: (801) 422-0265 
steve_sandberg@byu.edu 
Attorneys for Defendants Brigham Young 
University and Sarah Robinson 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDAL ROY MALLORY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a Utah 
nonprofit corporation, VERN STRATTON, 
and DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
ARNOLD LEMMON 
Civil No. 090403834 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
1. I, Arnold Lemmon, am over the age of 18 and have personal knowledge of the 
matters set forth herein. 
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2. I am currently employed by University Police, a division of Brigham Young 
University, as a peace officer at the rank of lieutenant. My specific peace officer authority is as a 
law enforcement officer, under Utah Code Ann. Section 53-13-103(1 )(b)(xi). 
3. Under Special Event Directive No. SE2008-028,1 was designated as the event 
supervisor for the Spring Football Blue and White Game on Saturday, April 12, 2008 (the 
"Game"). 
4. My supervision responsibilities extended to all pre-event, event, and post-event 
security, crowd control, and traffic direction at the Game. I directed the deployment of each 
sworn officer and each student traffic cadet to their various posts either directly or via delegation 
to the senior officer or senior student traffic cadet under my supervision. 
5. Three sworn officers—Officers Bennett, Strong, and Soakai—assisted me by 
barricading Canyon Road prior to the Ganae, patrolling the stands and premises during the Game, 
and providing crowd control after the Game. 
6. Five student traffic cadets—Cadets Castellano, Crowe, Nomiyama, Robinson, and 
Beeseley—assisted me by maintaining road closures on Canyon Road during the Game and 
maintaining those same closures and assisting traffic out of Lot 45 onto Canyon Road and 
University Avenue after the Game. 
7. I and all other officers and student traffic cadets assisting with security, crowd 
control, and traffic direction carried University Police-issued radios and maintained radio contact 
with each other via the "Events" radio frequency. 
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8. Prior to the Game, I personally opened the gate from Lot 45 onto University 
Avenue to allow traffic to exit Lot 45 to the west and onto University Avenue. 
9. When student traffic cadet Robinson radioed that an accident had occurred on 
University Avenue, I responded and took hands-on direction of all aspects of responding to the 
crash. 
DATED thisaff day of tftVXLL, 2010. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ^ day of '?)2M£JL1> 2010. 
BETTY MAE JOHNSON 
NovwpuBuc-miECftm 
A-357 ASB 
PHOVO,UTAH 84802 
COMM.BXRM1-201* 
Notary Public /_ ' £/^ — 
3 
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Curtis L. Wenger (7013) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
30 East Broadway, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 870-0453 
IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDAL ROY MALLORY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a 
Utah Corporation, VERN 
STRATTON, and DOES I-X, 
Defendants 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 090902577 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
Plaintiff complains and for causes of action alleges as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. The Plaintiff, Randal Roy MaUory ("MaUory"), is an individual residing in Utah 
County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant, Brigham Young University ("BYU"), is a Utah Corporation, doing 
business in, and with offices located in, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendant, Vera Stratton ("BYU"), is an individual residing in Utah County, State 
of Utah. 
4. Defendant, Sarah Robinson, was a student and an employee and/or agent of 
Defendant BYU. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that, at all times herein 
mentioned, each of the DOE defendants I-V sued herein was the agent and employee 
of BYU and was at all times acting within the purpose and scope of such agency and 
employment. 
6. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as 
DOES VI through X, inclusive, and therefore sues these defendants by such 
fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to allege their true names and 
capacities when ascertained. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(For Negligence Against BYU, ROBINSON, STRATTON, and DOES I-X) 
7. The Plaintiff hereby incorporates his prior allegations herein. 
8. At all times herein mentioned, defendant Stratton was the owner of a certain 1999 
Lincoln Towncar automobile, Utah License No. 626 K2E. 
9. At all times herein mentioned defendant ROBINSON was a BYU traffic cadet and 
was the agent and/or employee of BYU and in doing the things herein alleged, was 
acting within the purpose and scope of this agency and employment 
10. At all times herein mentioned Plaintiff was, and is, the owner of a certain Harley 
Davidson motorcycle, Utah License no. 386 XH. 
11. At all times herein mentioned University Avenue runs past the BYU parking located 
south of 1850 North in Provo, Utah ("BYU Parking Lot")- University Avenue runs 
north and south past the west entrance/exit to the BYU Parking Lot. Said 
entrance/exit is approximately fifty (50) feet south of 1850 North. 
12. On or about April 12,2008, at or about the hour of 2:45 p.m., Plaintiff was 
operating the Harley Davidson motorcycle and was at a stop in the north exit lane of 
the west entrance/exit of the BYU Parking Lot facing west. 
13. Plaintiff was stopped awaiting the directions of the BYU traffic cadet, ROBINSON, 
to proceed south on University Avenue. 
14. After ROBINSON negligently stopped the north and south bound traffic on 
University Avenue, ROBINSON negligently directed Plaintiff to make his left hand 
turn and continue south on University Avenue, 
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15. At that time and place Stratton was proceeding south bound on University Avenue 
approaching the entrance/exit of the BYU Parking Lot. Stratton either disobeyed 
the directions of ROBINSON to stop as all three other lanes had stopped, or 
negligently proceed past traffic that had been stopped in the inside lane and 
negligently, carelessly, recklessly, and unlawfully struck the Plaintiff who was 
following the specific instructions of ROBINSON. 
16. The negligent, careless, reckless, and/or unlawful actions of ROBINSON and 
Stratton proximately caused Stratton's vehicle to collide with Plaintiffs motorcycle 
and to proximately cause the injuries and damages hereinafter described. 
17. As a proximate result of the negligence, carelessness, and unlawfulness of 
defendants, and each of them, and the resulting collision, as herein alleged, Plaintiff 
was injured in his health, strength, and activity, sustaining injury to his body and 
shock and injury to his nervous system and person, and among others, sustained the 
following personal injuries: severe skull fracture and intracranial hemorrhage, all 
of which injuries have caused and continue to cause plaintiff great mental, physical, 
and nervous pain and suffering. These injuries have resulted in a permanent 
disability to plaintiff, and he is and will continue to be unable to be gainfully 
employed and entitle the Plaintiff to general damage in a sum according to proof. 
18. As a further proximate result of the negligence of defendants, and each of them, as 
herein alleged, plaintiff was required to and did employ physicians and surgeons for 
medical examination, treatment, and care of these injuries and did incur medical 
and incidental expenses. As a further proximate result of the negligence of 
defendants, and each of them, plaintiff has incurred other and will incur further 
medical and incidental expenses for the care and treatment of these injuries, the 
exact amount of which is unknown at the present time. 
19. Prior to the time of the events described herein plaintiff was gainfully employed as a 
salesman for dental laboratories, and was earning an average monthly income in 
excess of $10,000.00. As a further proximate result of the negligence of defendants, 
and each of them, as herein alleged, plaintiff was prevented from attending to his 
usual occupation and has been damaged thereby in the amount of at least 
$2,000,000,00. 
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20. Immediately prior to and at the time of the collision, Plaintiffs motorcycle was in 
good mechanical condition. As a further proximate result of the negligence of 
defendants, and each of them, as herein alleged, Plaintiffs motorcycle was damaged 
and depreciated to the extent of at least $10,000.00, which sum is a reasonable 
amount for the necessary repairs to the motorcycle. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against defendants, and each of them, as follows: 
1. For general damages according to proof. 
2. For all medical and incidental expenses according to proof. 
3. For all loss of earnings according to proof. 
4. For repairs to plaintiffs automobile in the sum of $10,000.00. 
5. For costs of suit herein incurred. 
6. For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper. 
9"^ 
lis O ( DATED this P_ day of July, 2009. 
CURTIS L. WENGER 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the (j 1 day of July, 2009, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT was Served on the following via United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Third District Court 
450 South State St, 
POB 1860 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Joseph J. Joyce 
J. Joyce & Associates 
10813 South Ricer Front Parkway, Ste 460 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Thomas W. Seiler, Esq. 
Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, LC 
2500 North University Avenue 
PO Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
